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Bad Faith in Cyberspace: Grounding Domain Name Theory in
Trademark, Property and Restitution
Jacqueline D. Lipton*

Abstract
The year 2009 marks the tenth anniversary of domain name regulation under the
Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) and the Uniform Domain
Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP). Adopted to combat cybersquatting,
these rules left a confused picture of domain name theory in their wake. Early
cybersquatters registered Internet domain names corresponding with other’s
trademarks to sell them for a profit. However, this practice was quickly and
easily contained. New practices arose in domain name markets, not initially
contemplated by the drafters of the ACPA and the UDRP. One example is
clickfarming – using domain names to generate revenues from click-on
advertisements.
To avoid trademark liability, most clickfarmers and
cybersquatters utilize personal names, geographic and cultural indicators, and
generic terms as domain names. The application of current regulations to these
practices is unclear, largely because of the lack of a coherent policy basis for
domain name regulation. This article develops a new model for domain name
regulation. It incorporates trademark policy within a broader theoretical
framework incorporating aspects of restitution and property theory. The author
suggests that a broader theoretical approach to domain name regulation would
facilitate the development of more coherent domain name rules in the future.
This discussion is particularly timely in light of the forthcoming implementation
of a new generic Top Level Domain (gTLD) application process.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Think back, if you can, to the early days of the new frontier - not the Western
frontier, but the virtual frontier. Like the Western frontier, the early Internet was largely
barren space awaiting cultivation. Virtual prospectors never knew if they would strike it
rich or die trying. However, some clever prospectors managed to secure something that
their real world counterparts never imagined possible – a guarantee of striking gold if
they moved fast. Enter the cybersquatter…
In the early to mid 1990s, a handful of tech-savvy virtual prospectors realized the
value of trademarks in the domain space long before many mark-holders did. These
prospectors registered multiple domain names corresponding with trademarks very
inexpensively.1 They offered to sell them back to the trademark holders for a handsome
profit.2 Today, this practice is old news, and infrequent in practice. Quick to react to the
cyberquatting threat, judges held early cybersquatters liable for trademark infringement
and dilution.3 The United States Congress son followed with the Anti-Cybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act (ACPA),4 while the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers (ICANN)5 adopted the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy
(UDRP).6 These measures more than met the challenges posed by cybersquatting.
However, the application of these rules left a confused pastiche of domain name
policy in their wake. As the rules were narrowly targeted to protect trademarks against
1

See, for example, http://www.toeppen.com/, last viewed on August 10, 2009 (describing the early
cybersquatting of famous cybersquatter, Dennis Toeppen); Cybersquatters: Invading Big Names’
Domains, CNN.com Technology, September 25, 2000, available at
http://archives.cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/09/06/internet.domains/index.html, last viewed on August
10, 2009.
2
DAVID KESMODEL, THE DOMAIN GAME: HOW PEOPLE GET RICH FROM INTERNET DOMAIN
NAMES, 20 (2008) (“Hundreds of early speculators registered domains associated with trademarks – names
or symbols used to identify a company’s goods and to distinguish them from those sold by others. The
classic tactic was to register a domain, do nothing with it (create no Web site), wait to hear from the
trademark holder, and then offer to sell it for a high privce. This practice came to be known as
cybersquatting.”)
3
Panavision v Toeppen, 141 F 3d 1316 (9th Cir, 1998) (cybersquatter liable for trademark dilution);
Planned Parenthood Federation of America v Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q. 1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (infringement and
dilution liability of registrant found, although this is not a typical cybersquatting case because there was no
sale motive on the part of the registrant).
4
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d).
5
MILTON MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT: INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND THE TAMING OF
CYBERSPACE, 3 (2004) (describing the development of ICANN as the body to administer the domain name
system); Christine Haight Farley, Convergence and Incongruence: Trademark Law and ICANN’s
Introduction of New Generic Top-Level Domains, 25 JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW 625,
626 (2008) (“The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers or ICANN, is the body that
governs the Internet’s infrastructure.”); see also www.icann.org, last viewed on August 10, 2009.
6
Full text of the policy available at: http://www.icann.org/en/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm,last
viewed on August 10, 2009.
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cybersquatting, they did not provide a coherent theoretical basis for domain name
regulation that might apply more generally. Part of the reason for the narrowness in
focus relates to the question as to who, if anyone, has constitutional power to make
general policy for the domain space. While ICANN administers the technical side of the
domain name system, its by-laws limit its policy making role to “policy development
reasonably and appropriately related to [its] technical functions.”7 Domestic legislatures
and courts can only reach disputes within their jurisdictional competence.
In the absence of a central policy-making body, each entity dealing with domain
name conflicts can only address a small piece of a much larger puzzle. This results in a
domain name market that is regulated inconsistently, often leading to wasteful uses of
potentially valuable online assets. The domain space becomes clogged with registrations
of multiple domain names by speculators who, more often than not, will park websites
under the names and fail to use them for any particularly useful purpose, in the hope that
someday they may sell the names for a profit.8 In the meantime, they may derive revenue
from click-on advertising.9 Domain name speculators now typically rely on registrations
of personal names, geographical and cultural indicators, and generic words and phrases in
the domain space.10
Thus, the practice of domain name speculating has moved away from trademark
policy, while the regulatory system has not. This creates an inconsistency between the
robust regulation of trademarks in the domain space and the lack of regulation over any
other conduct. There is a glaring need to develop a coherent theory of domain name
regulation. Domain name conflicts are not likely to subside any time soon.11
Additionally, the development of a more robust domain name theory may facilitate policy
developments in the emerging area of search engine law.12 Domain name regulation will
be an important aspect of search engine law because of the pivotal role played by domain
names in search engine algorithms.13 Rules about balancing competing rights and
7

Bylaws for Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numkers, Art I, Section 1(3). Full text
available at: http://www.icann.org/en/general/bylaws.htm, last viewed on August 10, 2009.
8
KESMODEL, supra note ___, at 136-138 (2008) (describing the practice of domain name
“parking”).
9
id, at 68-73 (describing the development of pay-per-click advertising systems).
10
id, at 24-33 (noting use of generic and other terms in the domain space by domain name
speculators).
11
See, WIPO, Record Number of Cybersquatting Cases in 2008, WIPO Proposes Paperless UDRP,
March 16, 2009 (available at http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2009/article_0005.html, last
viewed on August 10, 2009).
12
See Viva Moffat, Regulating Search, 22 HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW AND
TECHNOLOGY 475 (2009); Greg Lastowka, Google’s Law, 73 BROOKLYN L REV 1327
(2008); Oren Bracha and Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness
and Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L REV 1129 (2008); James
Grimmelman, The Structure of Search Engine Law, 93 IOWA L REV 1 (2007); Urs Gasser,
Regulating Search Engines: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead, 8 YALE J L & TECH 201
(2006); Eric Goldman, Search Engine Bias and The Rise of Search Engine Utopianism, 8
YALE J L& TECH 188 (2006); Playboy v Netscape, 354 F.3d 1020 (2004); Rescuecom Corp.,
Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Google Inc., Defendant-Appellee, 2009 U.S. App LEXIS 7160 (2nd Cir,
2009); Perfect 10 v Google, 508 F 3d 1146 (9th Cir, 2007).
13
In fact, Microsoft’s new search engine, Bing, has been criticized for giving too much weight to
domain names in its search algorithm. See Is Bing’s Algorithm Domain Name Heavy, blogpost at Search
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interests in the domain space will impact on search engine results. Domain name theory
may also assist search engines in developing policies about their own uses of trademarks,
personal names, cultural and geographic indicators, and generic words in search engine
algorithms and keyword advertising programs.
The creation of a coherent theory for domain name regulation may also play an
important role in the new generic Top Level Domain (gTLD) application process soon to
be rolled out by ICANN.14 The identification of coherent theoretical principles governing
the domain space will be imperative for the release of new gTLDs.15 The fact that
ICANN may not have the constitutional power to implement all relevant policies itself and that implementation may ultimately fall to a combination of domestic courts,
legislators, and private arbitrators – means that relatively quick work is needed to create
the theoretical groundwork. If multiple bodies need to work together to create a
workable regulatory matrix matrix, then the earlier appropriate policies can be identified,
the better.
Part II extrapolates three theoretical justifications for domain name regulation:
property theory; trademark policy; and, restitution or unjust enrichment. These three
justifications may have to be developed simultaneously to create a useful framework for
future domain name regulation. Part III moves from the general to the specific in
identifying regulatory inconsistencies in the domain space based on the current limited
theoretical focus. It considers particular instances of regulatory gaps including
inconsistencies relating to the registration of domain names corresponding with
trademarks, personal names, political words and phrases, cultural and geographic
indicators, and generic words and phrases. It suggests ways in which the theoretical
models identified in Part II may assist in the development of more robust and consistent
policy determinations going forwards. Part IV considers the position of domain name
registries in terms of potential liability for bad faith activities of their registrants. Part V
concludes by making suggestions for future directions in domain name regulation.

II. THREE THEORIES OF DOMAIN NAME REGULATION
A. EXTRAPOLATING THEORY FROM PRACTICE
This Part extrapolates from past practice the implicit theoretical impulses that
appear to have guided courts, legislatures, and ICANN in regulating the domain space to
date. Courts in early cybersquatting cases tended to focus squarely on existing trademark
policy to regulate the domain space. They found that cybersquatting constituted either
trademark infringement or dilution, depending on the circumstances.16 Infringement
Engine Roundtable, July 13, 2009, available at http://www.seroundtable.com/archives/020382.html, last
viewed on August 10, 2009.
14
Farley, supra note ___, at 625 (gTLDs are “generic top-level domains”), 626 (noting that ICANN
has accredited 15 gTLDs to date including .com, .net, and .edu), 626 (noting that ICANN is now
considering a new system to approve new gTLDs in the hundreds or thousands).
15
id., describing the mis-match between trademark policy and domain name regulation and the
implications of the current inconsistencies for the proposed new gTLD process.
16
KESMODEL, supra note ___, at 23-24 (noting how early trademark law dealt effectively with
cybersquatters).
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requires the mark holder to establish a likelihood of consumer confusion as to the source
of products or services.17 Dilution has no consumer confusion requirement and is limited
to the protection of famous marks.18 The dilution action comes in two forms – blurring
and tarnishment. Blurring relates to the creation of noise around a mark that interferes
with its capacity to operate as a mark.19 Tarnishment relates to the creation of unsavory
associations with a mark.20
Despite the early focus on trademark policy, the basis for applying traditional
trademark doctrines to cybersquatting was a little confused, suggesting that a pure
trademark-based policy model was insufficient for the domain space. For example, the
Ninth Circuit struggled to explain why a cybersquatter who conducted no commercial
activities on his website was acting in commerce as required by the Lanham Act.21 A trial
judge in the Southern District of New York likewise struggled to explain why a domain
name registrant who was not conducting any significant commercial activities on his
website was nevertheless potentially confusing consumers in commerce as required for a
successful infringement action.22 While traditional trademark policy had its uses, the
awkwardness of applying existing trademark doctrines to cybersquatting soon prompted
action by the United States Congress and ICANN. They adopted the ACPA and the
UDRP respectively.
While still expressly based on trademark policy, the new regulations were focused
narrowly on specific domain name conduct: cybersquatting. Each set of rules prohibits
the registration of a domain name corresponding with someone else’s trademark23 with a
bad faith profit motive.24 Both contain non-exhaustive lists of bad faith factors to guide
courts and arbitrators.25 Both contain defenses for a person who has registered a domain
name for a legitimate purpose.26 Neither specifically contemplates conflicts in the
domain space outside of cybersquatting on other people’s trademarks. The ACPA is a
little broader in scope than the UDRP in that it contains an additional sui generis
protection for personal names regardless of their trademark status.27 The fact that the
ACPA extends protections to non-trademarked personal names suggests a broader
regulatory impulse than that stemming solely from trademark policy. While trademark
policy obviously has a significant role to play in the ACPA, there must be other
regulatory justifications at least in relation to the protection of non-trademarked personal
names. The statutory concern with bad faith intent to profit suggests an unjust
enrichment – or restitutionary – rationale as an alternative policy basis for the legislation.
17

15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1)(a); 1125(a)(1).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c)(1); 1125(c)(2)(A).
19
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B).
20
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C).
21
Panavision v Toeppen, 141 F 3d 1316, 1324-1326, (9th Cir, 1998).
22
Planned Parenthood Federation of America v Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q. 1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), pp 13-15
(LEXIS PAGE REFS).
23
Note that neither set of rules expressly requires the mark to be registered; thus each will protect
unregistered marks.
24
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i); UDRP, para 4(a)(iii).
25
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i); UDRP, para 4(b).
26
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii); UDRP, para 4(c).
27
15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A).
18
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It should be noted that despite concerns about the scope of their underlying
theoretical justifications, the ACPA and the UDRP have been effective in practice in the
context of traditional cybersquatting on trademarks. The UDRP, in particular, is
inexpensive, accessible, and efficient,28 and does not raise the jurisdictional concerns
inherent in litigation.29 The UDRP is incorporated by reference into registration
agreements for all domain names utilizing gTLDs such as “.com”, “.org”, and “.net”.30
The major limitation of the UDRP today is that most modern disputes today do not
involve traditional trademark cybersquatting. The more recent conflicts raise issues not
so neatly resolved by a trademark policy rationale. Thus, there is a need to find other
theoretical explanations for domain name policy that could work alongside the existing,
but limited, trademark policy justification. As suggested in the previous paragraph,
existing practice suggests at least two distinct, but sometimes overlapping, policy
justifications for domain name regulation: trademark policy, and restitution or unjust
enrichment. To this, we might add a property rights justification for regulation in some
more unusual circumstances involving bad faith conduct in the domain space.31

B. A TRIPARTITE THEORETICAL MODEL: PROPERTY THEORY, RESTITUTION,
AND TRADEMARK POLICY
Of the three theoretical justifications for domain name regulation, a property
rights justification may at first glance appear to be the most intuitively appealing. This is
because the domain name market involves routine trading of domain name assets.32
Since the early days of the commercial Internet, domain names have been equated with
property rights in a variety of contexts.33 Real world property analogies can be easily
made with domain names, although each analogy has limitations. It is easy to think about
bad faith conduct involving domain names in terms of trespass or conversion. One might
describe cybersquatting as a form of trespassing – or squatting - on someone else’s virtual
property. Generally, a property holder in the real world can remove a trespasser if the
trespasser has not used the property for long enough to raise a plausible adverse
possession argument.34
28

Jacqueline Lipton, Celebrity in Cyberspace, 65 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW 1445, 14489 (2008) (“The advantages of the UDRP over litigation are that it is inexpensive and fast compared to
litigation, and its reach is effectively global because relevant parties are bound to it by contract wherever
they may physically reside. Thus, it has been the avenue of choice for most domain name complainants.”)
[hereinafter, Celebrity in Cyberspace]
29
id, at 1474 (“The actor Kevin Spacey … failed to establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant
in litigation for control of the domain name <kevinspacey.com>. He then went on to successfully obtain
control of the name in a UDRP proceeding.”)
30
See http://www.icann.org/en/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm, at Note 2, last viewed on August 10,
2009.
31
See discussion in Part II.B infra.
32
For a general discussion of modern domain name markets, see KESMODEL, supra note ___.
33
See, for example, Kremen v Cohen, 337 F 3d 1024 (9th Cir 2003) (finding domain name to be
property for the purposes of the Californian statutory tort of conversion).
34
Walter Quentin Impert, Whose Land is it Anyway? It’s Time to Reconsider Sovereign Immunity
from Adverse Possession, 49 U.C.L.A. LAW REV 447, 448 (2001) (“People are often surprised to learn that
a trespasser may take title to land from a true owner under certain conditions and that such theft is
authorized by the government under laws of adverse possession.”)
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Trespass is not the only property analogy that can be made with cybersquatting.
Early cybersquatters did not regard themselves as trespassers. Some thought of
themselves as being more like property speculators.35 They took a gamble that certain
pieces of virtual property – domain names corresponding with other people’s trademarks
– would be more valuable to the mark holders than to anyone else. Thus, a cybersquatter
who could beat a markholder to registration could make a handsome profit. In the real
world, there is nothing wrong with this entrepreneurial impulse. If I buy property
adjacent to your land in the hope of selling it to you for a profit because I have speculated
that you may want to expand your business onto the land, I am within my rights to charge
whatever price I want for the sale.
The problem is that neither of these real property analogies is a perfect fit for the
virtual world. The speculating analogy ultimately falls short because a trademark holder
does have some rights in a domain name corresponding with her trademark as a matter of
trademark policy.36 A real property holder, on the other hand, has no pre-existing rights
in adjacent land. The trespass analogy is also problematic because it is only possible in
the real world to trespass on land that another person legally owns. Even though a
trademark holder may have some interest in a domain name corresponding with her mark,
she does not own the domain name unless she has registered it.
Under current regulations like the ACPA and the UDRP, we might infer that there
is an implicit assumption that a trademark holder has property rights in corresponding
domain names. However, the full extent of those rights is unclear. Some judges and
arbitrators have suggested that those rights might extend to “trademark.com” domain
names, but not necessarily to other iterations of the trademark in the domain space.37
Nevertheless, this view is not universally accepted.38 Thus, while a property rights
rationale for domain name regulation is useful, what is currently missing is guidance as to
the nature and scope of any property rights that may be protected in the domain space.
This question becomes even more complex when one departs from the more familiar
trademark territory and turns to consideration of property rights in personal names,
geographic and cultural indicators, and generic terms in the domain space. Applying the
35

See www.toeppen.com, last viewed on August 10, 2009 (“In 1995, I registered about 200 domain
names. Some were generic English words, like hydrogen.com. Others corresponded with trademarks that
were shared by more than one company, like americanstandard.com. And some corresponded with
trademarked coined words, like panavision.com.
It was clear to me at the time that domain names were valuable, undeveloped virtual real estate. There was
absolutely no statutory or case law regarding trademarks in the context of Internet domain names at the
time. It seemed to be an excellent opportunity to do the virtual equivalent of buying up property around a
factory -- eventually the factory owner would realize that he needed the scarce resource which I
possessed.”)
36
This is evidenced by the availability of trademark infringement and dilution actions in early
cyberqsuatting cases: KESMODEL, supra note ___, at 23-24.
37
See, for example, discussion in Jacqueline Lipton, Commerce versus Commentary: Gripe Sites,
Parody, and the First Amendment in Cyberspace, 84 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY L REV 1327, 1359-1361
(2006) [hereinafter, Commerce versus Commentary].
38
For example, the majority panelists in Bruce Springsteen v Jeff Burgar, WIPO Arbitration and
Mediation Center Case No D2000-1532 (Jan 2001) where prepared to allow an unauthorized use of the
“brucespringsteen.com” domain name by a fan who had registered it, on the basis that Bruce Springsteen
had his own web presence under “brucespringsteen.net”. The majority panelists accepted a trademark in
Springsteen’s name with some reservations, but decided the case on other grounds.
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property rights rationale, we might argue that a person has property rights in her name
that could be protected against those seeking to profit from the name in the domain space.
However, many commentators reject property rights in a personal name.39
The property rights rationale may nevertheless be useful in some admittedly
limited circumstances involving generic domain names. There have been a few cases
where a domain name “thief” has fraudulently secured a transfer of a generic domain
name initially registered to another person.40 The obtaining of the fraudulent transfer by
the wrongdoer has been likened by some commentators to theft or conversion of physical
property in the real world.41 The willingness to attach a property label to the virtual
property in these cases has enabled at least one court to attach secondary liability to a
domain name registry where the fraudulent transferee could not be located.42 Thus, the
property rights rationale for domain name regulation may have a place in a broader
theoretical justification for domain name law. However, its usefulness may be limited to
fairly unusual cases.
The trademark policy rationale, on the other hand, now has a more pronounced
place in the regulatory matrix. It has been very useful in the regulation of cybersquatting.
While the UDRP in particular has become the most popular avenue for cybersquatting
disputes, trademark infringement and dilution actions, and some ACPA cases still filter
39

Mark McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U PITT L REV 225,
247 (2005) (“It might be true that identity is sufficiently similar to other objects the law regards as property
and therefore deserves at least some of the sticks in the traditional bundle of property rights. But far too few
courts and commentators have offered a theory as to why any of the traditional property justifications lead
to that conclusion. Such approaches are reflective of the general imprecision that has plagued the right of
publicity.”).
40
Kremen v Cohen, 337 F 3d 1024 (9th Cir 2003) (involving “sex.com”). See also Purva Patel, Not
Masters of Their (Web) Domains After All: Stolen Internet Names Difficult to Track, Houston Chronicle,
August 5, 2009, available at http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/tech/news/6560302.html, last viewed on
August 10, 2009 (involving “p2p.com” domain name).
41
Kremen v Cohen, 337 F 3d 1024 (9th Cir 2003) (holding fraudulently obtained transfer of
“sex.com” domain name to be conversion under Californian tort statute).
42
id., at 1030 (“Property is a broad concept that includes "every intangible benefit and prerogative
susceptible of possession or disposition." …. We apply a three-part test to determine whether a property
right exists: "First, there must be an interest capable of precise definition; second, it must be capable of
exclusive possession or control; and third, the putative owner must have established a legitimate claim to
exclusivity." ….. Domain names satisfy each criterion. Like a share of corporate stock or a plot of land, a
domain name is a well-defined interest. Someone who registers a domain name decides where on the
Internet those who invoke that particular name -- whether by typing it into their web browsers, by
following a hyperlink, or by other means -- are sent. Ownership is exclusive in that the registrant alone
makes that decision. Moreover, like other forms of property, domain names are valued, bought and sold,
often for millions of dollars,…, and they are now even subject to in rem jurisdiction …. Finally, registrants
have a legitimate claim to exclusivity. Registering a domain name is like staking a claim to a plot of land at
the title office. It informs others that the domain name is the registrant's and no one else's. Many registrants
also invest substantial time and money to develop and promote websites that depend on their domain
names. Ensuring that they reap the benefits of their investments reduces uncertainty and thus encourages
investment in the first place, promoting the growth of the Internet overall…. Kremen therefore had an
intangible property right in his domain name, and a jury could find that Network Solutions "wrongfully
disposed of" that right to his detriment by handing the domain name over to Cohen.”)
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through domestic courts to protect trademark rights in the domain space.43 The
trademark policy rationale breaks down into at least two, and possibly three, distinct
elements. The two most obvious sub-sets of trademark policy relate to the protection of
trademark holders against infringement and dilution respectively. The ACPA may
ground a third trademark-policy rationale for domain name regulation, if “bad faith
cybersquatting on trademarks” is regarded as a separate head of trademark policy distinct
from the infringement and dilution impulses.44 The UDRP can be justified on the basis of
trademark policy because of its focus on trademark-protection, and the tracking of
trademark doctrine in its drafting.45 However, recent UDRP arbitrations evidence some
straying from this theoretical underpinning to the extent that arbitrators are prepared to
grant protection for less obviously trademarked terms like personal names.46
A third policy rationale for domain name regulation that may explain the bleeding
of UDRP policy outside of clear trademark doctrine into some other areas not so easily
justified under traditional trademark theory may be found in restitution – or unjust
enrichment - theory. Restitution is less well developed in the United States than in some
other countries.47 Nevertheless, the basic premise is that a defendant has been unjustly
enriched at the expense of a complainant, and the plaintiff is entitled to a remedy.48 The
advantage of restitution theory is that it does not require a property right in the hands of
the complainant.49 Thus, it might explain domain name conflicts where a domain name
registrant has taken advantage of the goodwill a complainant has built up in a word or
phrase regardless of whether the complainant has a property, or trademark, right in that
word or phrase.
This might occur in the case of personal names that have not acquired trademark
status, or in the context of geographical terms where, say, a local tourist board has built
up some goodwill in the name of a city, but not in a trademark sense.50 To support an
unjust enrichment justification, the domain name registrant must have been enriched at
43

See, for example, Bosley v Kremer, 403 F.3d 672 (2005); People for the Ethical Treatment of
Animals v Doughney, 263 F.3d 359 (2001).
44
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1).
45
UDRP, paras 4(a), 4(b) and 4(c).
46
Lipton, Celebrity in Cyberspace, supra note ___, at 1527 (“The continued development of
personal domain name jurisprudence based on trademark principles threatens to warp the boundaries of
trademark law and to unjustifiably extend trademark practice online into areas where the alleged
trademarks are mere fictions…. In any event, the application of the trademark-based UDRP to personal
domain name disputes is clearly creating inconsistent results.”)
47
The American law on restitution is currently stated in the Restatement of the Law, Restitution
(1937).
48
id., at § 1 (“A person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make
restitution to the other.”)
49
id, at Comment b (“A person confers a benefit upon another if he gives to the other possession of
or some other interest in money, land, chattels, or choses in action, performs services beneficial to or at the
request of the other, satisfies a debt or a duty of the other, or in any way adds to the other's security or
advantage. He confers a benefit not only where he adds to the property of another, but also where he saves
the other from expense or loss. The word "benefit," therefore, denotes any form of advantage.”)
50
GILSON ON TRADEMARKS, § 2.03[4][d] (“Just as with descriptive terms, a trademark or trade name
that consists of a personal name (first name, surname, or both) is entitled to legal protection only if it attains
secondary meaning.”).
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the expense of the plaintiff. Thus, a restitutionary rationale for domain name regulation
will be limited to situations where a registrant has profited unjustly from a domain name
in which the complainant has legitimate, although potentially non-proprietary or nontrademark, interests. An example might be where the defendant operates a clickfarm
from a domain name in which the plaintiff has some legitimate interests. The
identification of these three distinct, albeit sometimes overlapping, theoretical
justifications might assist in resolving some of the current gaps and inconsistencies
inherent in domain name regulation.

III. EXISTING REGULATORY INCONSISTENCIES
A. GENERAL REGULATORY INCONSISTENCIES
The current state of domain name regulation might be summarized as set out in
Table 1. This table matches the various motivations for domain name registration against
the most obvious categories of words and phrases that are commonly registered as
domain names. The individual cells within the table identify the extent to which each
pairing of market motivations with word type is regulated under existing rules. The
results evidence an inconsistent and unpredictable pastiche of regulations. There is not a
clear and consistent underlying theoretical basis for domain name regulation.
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Table 1: Relationship Between Registrants’ Motivations and Categories of Domain
Name Registered
Sale Motive

Clickfarming
Motive

Expressive Use

Trademarks

Traditional
cybersquatting

Potentially
cybersquatting

Personal Names

Traditional
cybersquatting (if
name is
trademarked) and
15 U.S.C. §
1129(1)(A) liability
(regardless of
trademark)
No regulation
unless name is
trademarked
Presumptively
legitimate use
Cybersquatting

Potentially
cybersquatting (if
name is
trademarked); little
recourse if no
trademark

Usually legitimate,
particularly if the
registrant does not
use the “.com”
version of the
name51
Usually legitimate
use, particularly if
registrant does not
use “.com” version
of trademarked
personal name

No regulation unless
term is trademarked

Presumptively
legitimate use

Presumptively
legitimate use

Presumptively
legitimate use
Potentially
cybersquatting

Presumptively
legitimate use
Unclear –
potentially
legitimate use
Unclear –
potentially
legitimate use

Presumptively
legitimate use
No legitimate
use

Generally
legitimate use

No legitimate
use

Cultural and
geographic
indicators
Generic words &
phrases
Deliberate
misspellings of
trademarks
Deliberate
misspellings of
personal names

“trademarksucks”
names

Cybersquatting (if
name is
trademarked); little
recourse if no
trademark
Unclear

Potentially
cybersquatting (if
name is
trademarked); little
recourse if no
trademark
Unclear –
potentially
trademark
infringement,
dilution or
cybersquatting

Legitimate
Commercial
Use
Competing
TM interests –
first come, first
served

Competing
personal
names – first
come first
served.

No legitimate
use

The only conduct that is clearly sanctioned under current regulations is traditional
cybersquatting – represented in the first and fifth rows of Column 1. The regulation of
other conduct is largely unclear. It is possible to discern some general principles about
domain name regulation from this table, but at a fairly high level of abstraction. For
example, purely expressive uses of domain names are for the most part regarded as being
legitimate, regardless of the type of word or phrase registered – see Column 3. Even
expressive uses of trademarks (Column 3, Row 1) and of deliberate misspellings of
51

Lipton, Commerce versus Commentary, supra note ___, at 1359-1361.
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trademarks (Column 3, Row 5) may be legitimate uses if the associated website is used
for commentary, rather than commercial purposes.
Another general principle that may be derived from Table 1 is that registration of
a deliberate misspelling of another person’s trademark is presumptively illegitimate, at
least if undertaken for a commercial purpose. In fact, it is difficult to conceive of a
situation where someone registers a deliberate misspelling of another person’s trademark
for a purely expressive purpose, although it is possible that the operator of a purely
expressive gripe site or parody site may want to engage in this conduct. In any event, the
fifth and six rows of Column 4 are shaded out because it is difficult, if not impossible, to
conceive of any legitimate commercial purpose for registering a deliberate misspelling of
another’s mark or name.
Table 1 also illustrates the confusion inherent with respect to “sucks”-type
domain names.52 These are names that use a trademark with a pejorative word or phrase
attached: for example “nikesucks.com”. Typically, these domains are used for gripe sites
– websites that include critical commentary about a trademark holder.53 However, these
kinds of names are sometimes used for commercial purposes such as cybersquatting or
clickfarming.54 Where pejorative domain names are used for commercial purposes, they
are sometimes referred to as “sham speech” domain names.55 There is currently no clear
regulatory approach to “sucks”-type domain names.56 While most commercial uses of
such names are colorably illegitimate as they take advantage of the goodwill in a
trademark to draw custom for a non-related commercial purpose,57 some uses are
legitimately expressive and others combine expressive and commercial elements. The
development of a more coherent theoretical framework for domain name regulation
might assist in ascertaining what kinds of conduct concerning “sucks”-type domain
names should be proscribed, and on what basis. A theoretical framework based on both
trademark policy and unjust enrichment may be useful here to separate legitimate
expressive uses of “sucks”-type domain names from bad faith commercial uses.
Another notable feature of Table 1 is that it highlights the position of clickfarming
in the context of current domain name regulations. Most clickfarming involving
trademarks or deliberate misspellings of trademarks is potentially regulated as a form of
cybersquatting. This is because clickfarms that utilize other people’s trademarks
essentially use the marks for bad faith commercial profit motives. The commercial profit
motive in clickfarming is different from traditional cybersquatting. For clickfarmers, the
profit is not derived from a sale of the name, but rather from using the name to generate
revenue from click-through advertisements.58 Nevertheless, most cybersquatting
regulations are broad enough to encompass this kind of conduct. In the ACPA, for
52

DAVID LINDSAY, INTERNATIONAL DOMAIN NAME LAW: ICANN AND THE UDRP, 262 (2007).
id.
54
id.
55
id.
56
id.
57
This is why the last cell at the bottom of Column 4 in Table 1 is shaded out.
58
Jacqueline Lipton, Clickfarming: The New Cybersquatting?, 12 Journal of Internet Law 1,1
(2008) [hereinafter, Clickfarming].
53
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example, the notion of a bad faith intent to profit from a mark is not inextricably linked to
a sale motive.59 The bad faith factors in the UDRP are likewise not limited to a sale
motive. The intention to sell the domain name is only one of four non-exclusive bad faith
factors in the UDRP.60
Clickfarming involving words and phrases other than trademarks has a less clear
regulatory rationale. Personal names, and cultural and geographic terms that operate as
registered or unregistered marks will likely be protected from clickfarming in the same
way as other trademarks.61 However, non-trademarked names, words and phrases are
more troublesome. While various individuals and entities may have legitimate interests
in these terms, in the absence of a trademark, they have little recourse against
clickfarmers. Even the sui generis personal name protections in the Lanham Act will not
cover clickfarming because those provisions are limited to prohibiting registrations of
personal names as domain names with a sale motive.62
There is nothing necessarily wrong with this state of affairs if the regulatory
policy is that clickfarming is problematic only in trademark cases, on the basis that the
registrant is making unfair commercial profits from a valuable mark. The rationale for
distinguishing non-trademarked personal names, cultural and geographic indicators and
generic terms here would be that the people and entities with interests in those terms have
not necessarily put the same resources into developing goodwill in relevant words as the
trademark holder. However, this rationale may not bear close scrutiny.
Even an individual with no trademark interest in her personal name may have
spent time and resources into building up a public persona. Politicians, for example, may
not have commercial trademark interests in their names, but may nevertheless have spent
much time, effort and resources building up their professional reputations. The ability of
a clickfarmer to take unfair advantage of that reputation should arguably be sanctioned on
the same basis as the regulation of clickfarming that utilizes trademarks. Likewise, local
city councils may spend significant time and effort building up a reputation for their city
to attract tourism or business. It is not clear why those entities should be denied
protection against clickfarmers trading on their geographical reputations while trademark
holders are protected.
The failure to develop any regulations that prevent the monopolization of
different classes of words and phrases by clickfarmers creates a situation in which the
Internet potentially becomes clogged with clickfarms. Words and phrases that could be
used for more useful expressive or commercial purposes are effectively monopolized or
held to ransom by domain name speculators. The way in which one responds to this state
of affairs depends on the view one has of the domain name market more generally. Free
59

15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i).
UDRP, para 4(b)(i).
61
GILSON ON TRADEMARKS, § 2.03[4][d] (“Just as with descriptive terms, a trademark or trade name
that consists of a personal name (first name, surname, or both) is entitled to legal protection only if it attains
secondary meaning.”).
62
15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A).

60
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market advocates may well support domain name speculators who run clickfarms.
Others may be disappointed that the Internet will likely be unable to reach its full
potential as a global communications medium if more and more of its online addresses
are taken up by poorly maintained clickfarms advertising products that few people
want.63
Nevertheless, even those who support regulation to preserve the potential of the
Internet by reining in clickfarming face the problem of identifying: (a) a theoretical
rationale for regulation; (b) an entity with constitutional competence to regulate; and, (c)
a party or group with sufficient standing to enforce any regulations that may be
developed. These are extremely difficult questions, and this article focuses
predominantly on the first. The idea is that without a clear theoretical basis for
regulating, the following questions are moot. With no clear theoretical idea of the basis
for regulations, it does not matter who theoretically might regulate or how those
regulations might be enforced.64

B. SPECIFIC INCONSISTENCIES AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
1. Personal Names
This sub-Part addresses specific instances of the regulatory inconsistencies
identified in the previous section. It focuses on particular kinds of words and phrases
commonly registered in modern domain name markets. Trademarks are no longer the
coin of the realm in these markets as the most intuitively trademark-focused domain
names are now in the hands of trademark holders. Current battles revolve around other
words and phrases. One obvious example is personal names. Personal names have come
to the forefront of many modern domain name battles because of their obvious
commercial value and their uncertain trademark status.65 Many famous people cannot
necessarily assert trademarks in their personal names.66 This is especially true of famous
63

KESMODEL, supra note ___, at 138 (“Although domain parking clearly has been good for investors
and networks, the level of value the sites offer to consumers has been hotly debated. Some critics say the
proliferation of the bare-bones [clickfarms] has sullied the Internet. Some liken the millions of ad-bloated
sites to an endless stream of billboards along a highway, distracting drivers and ruining the scenery.”)
64
This is a bit of an oversimplification, because in reality the three regulatory questions overlap to
some extent. One might argue that in the absence of a competent regulating entity, the idea of formulating
theory is arguably moot because no body could meaningfully implement relevant policies. Even if there is
a competent entity – or entities – that might implement policy in new regulations, the regulations will be
meaningless if aggrieved persons either do not have standing or do not have sufficient access to dispute
resolution forums to enforce them. Nevertheless, there is some value in focusing on theory of regulation as
an initial matter. There are currently bodies who implement regulations, albeit in a piecemeal way. They
include ICANN, UDRP arbitrators, and domestic courts. The increasing pace of UDRP arbitrations over
the year also suggests that there is a significant body of complainants with sufficient standing to enforce
existing regulations – even if they are currently obliged to frame their complaints in trademark terms.
65
GILSON ON TRADEMARKS, § 2.03[4][d] (“Just as with descriptive terms, a trademark or trade name
that consists of a personal name (first name, surname, or both) is entitled to legal protection only if it attains
secondary meaning.”).
66
id.
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people who do not use their names in commerce: for example, politicians and some other
public figures.67
Domain name speculators often register personal names as domain names with
the aim of defending against any subsequent complaints on the basis of either a lack of a
trademark interest in the hands of the complainant, or possibly a lack of bad faith conduct
on the part of the registrant.68 It is usually relatively easy for domain name speculators to
beat famous people to registration of their names because many famous individuals,
unlike trademark holders, do not have, plan for, or even desire, an Internet presence.69
Thus, many valuable personal names are not initially registered by the people to whom
the names relate. The failure by those individuals to register the names leaves ample
opportunity for cybersquatters, clickfarmers and others to profit from the names. The
failure to register is also understandable because a name is supposed to be used once it is
registered. A registrant has to do something with the associated website. Many famous
people do not want to use the names at all. They simply do not want other people to
register them.70
Personal name conflicts in the domain space have involved all kinds of people:
actors,71 singers,72 sports stars,73 politicians,74 prominent business people,75 and other
67

Lipton, Celebrity in Cyberspace, supra note ___, at 1462-1468 (describing mismatch between
trademark law and the status of the personal names of politicians and public figures). See also Jacqueline
Lipton, Who Owns ‘hillary.com’? Political Speech and the First Amendment in Cyberspace, 49 BOSTON
COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 55 (2008).
68
William J Clinton v Web of Deception, Claim Number: FA0904001256123, National Arbitration
Forum, full text available at http://domains.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/1256123.htm , last viewed on
August 10, 2009. Registrant of <williamclinton.com>, <williamjclinton.com> and
<presidentbillclinton.com>, argued that the complainant had no trademark rights in his personal name, and
that the registrant had not registered and was not using the names in bad faith. Although the former
President established trademark rights in his personal name, the registrant’s bad faith argument was
successful and the arbitrator did not order transfer of the names to the former President.
69
See discussion of the dispute involving the name “juliaroberts.com” in Jacqueline Lipton, Beyond
Cybersquatting: Taking Domain Name Disputes Past Trademark Policy, 40 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
1361, 1414-1415 (2005) [hereinafter, Beyond Cybersquatting].
70
id.
71
Julia Fiona Roberts v Russell Boyd, WIPO Case No. D2000-0210, 30 May, 2000 (available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html ) (involving juliaroberts.com
domain name); Tom Cruise v Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case No D2006-0560, 5 July, 2006 (available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2006/d2006-0560.html) (involving tomcruise.com
domain name); Kevin Spacey v Alberta Hot Rods, National Arbitration Forum Claim No 114437, August 1,
2002 (available at http://www.arb-forum.com/domains/decisions/114437.htm) (involving the domain name
kevinspacey.com).
72
See, for example, Bruce Springsteen v Jeff Burgar and Bruce Springsteen Club, WIPO Case No.
D2000-1532, Jan. 25, 2001 (available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d20001532.html) (involving brucespringsteen.com domain name); Madonna Ciccone v Dan Parisi, WIPO Case
No. D2000-0847, Oct. 12, 2000 (available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0847.html) (involving Madonna.com
domain name); Experience Hendrix LLC v Denny Hammerton, WIPO Case. No. D2000-0364, August 2,
2000, aff’d August 15, 2000 (available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d20000364.html ) (involving jimihendrix.com domain name).
73
See, for example Bjorn Borg v Miguel Garcia, WIPO Case No. D2007-0591, June 21, 2007
(available at: http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2007/d2007-0591.html ) (involving the
domain name bjornborg.com).
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public figures.76 Additionally, some disputes have involved the names of private
individuals, although these are less common because non-famous names are less valuable
to domain name speculators.77 The recorded conflicts evidence a variety of motivations
for registration, including commercial and expressive purposes, and combinations of
both. For example, a private individual registered the domain name
“brucespringsteen.com” for an unauthorized fan site about the popular singer, Bruce
Springsteen.78 This is by and large an expressive purpose, although it is also possible for
fan site operators to make commercial profits by charging fees to join a fan club or
subscribe to a newsletter, or by operating a clickfarm on the website.79
As this article is focused on the extent to which a better theory of domain name
regulation could help with current domain name problems, a question arises as to whether
such a theory would help with personal names. While existing regulations have been
premised on trademark policy, the regulations have been skewed towards protection of
trademarks.80 Trademark policy does not always provide the best protection for personal
names. A pure trademark focus, for example, fails to explain the regulatory impulse
behind § 1129(1)(A) of the Lanham Act – the sui generis personal name protections
against cybersquatting. Clearly, the legislature saw a need to protect personal names.
However, Congress’s actions cannot be explained solely with respect to trademark
policy. There must be some other theoretical justification.
The unjust enrichment model might help with personal names. Unjust enrichment
theory does not require a trademark or even a generic property right to ground a claim for
relief. Table 2 contains examples of five hypothetical scenarios involving personal
domain names. The subsequent discussion illustrates how the adoption of a clearer
policy basis for the domain space – potentially based on unjust enrichment - might help
to resolve the conflicts arising in these scenarios.
74

William J Clinton v Web of Deception, Claim Number: FA0904001256123, National Arbitration
Forum, full text available at http://domains.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/1256123.htm , last viewed on
August 10, 2009; Hillary Rodham Clinton v Michele Dinoia, National Arbitration Forum Claim No
FA0502000414641, March 18, 2005 (full text available at http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/414641.htm); Kathleen Kennedy Townsend v Birt, WIPO Case No D20020030, April 11, 2002 (available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2002/d20020030.html).
75
Trudeau v Lanoue, 2006 U.S. Dixt. LEXIS 7956 (2006); Stephan Schmidheiny v Steven Weber,
285 F. Supp. 2d 613 (2003).
76
Anna Nicole Smith v DNS Research Inc, Claim No. FA0312000220007, National Arbitration
Forum, Feb 21, 2004 (available at: http://www.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/220007.htm) (involving
annanicolesmith.com domain name); The Hebrew University of Jerusalem v Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case
No. D2002-0616, October 7, 2002, (available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2002/d2002-0616.html) (involving a complaint with
respect to the domain name <alberteinstein.com>).
77
Paul Wright v Domain Source Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16024 (2002).
78
Bruce Springsteen v Jeff Burgar and Bruce Springsteen Club, WIPO Case No. D2000-1532, Jan.
25, 2001 (available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1532.html).
79
Lipton, Clickfarming, supra note ___, at 16 (describing practice of clickfarming on personal
names).
80
Lipton, Beyond Cybersquatting, supra note ___, at 1363 (“current dispute resolution mechanisms
are focused on the protection of commercial trademark interests, often to the detriment of other socially
important interests that may inhere in a given domain name.”)
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Table 2: Hypothetical Scenarios Involving Personal Names in the Domain Space

Scenario 1. An individual registers a domain name corresponding with the name
of an internationally famous Democrat ex-president with a view to illuminating the lack
of regulation for cybersquatting on personal names. Ultimately, he directs the domain
name to a website containing information posted by the Republican National Committee.
He makes no attempt to sell the name to the ex-president or to anyone else.81
Scenario 2. An individual registers a domain name corresponding with the name
of a minor celebrity known mainly for her reality TV show. She rose to fame as a model
with a weight problem who married a wealthy millionaire, but does not use her name to
sell any particular products or services. The registrant would be prepared to sell the name
to her for an acceptable fee.82
Scenario 3. An individual registers a domain name corresponding with the name
of a famous movie star for an unauthorized fan site containing click-on advertisements.
It is clear from the content of the website that it is not the “official” fan site for the movie
star. The click-through advertisements on the website are unrelated to any of the movie
star’s professional activities. The registrant makes no attempt to sell the name, although,
she would be prepared to consider an offer if it was forthcoming.83
Scenario 4. An individual registers a domain name corresponding with the name
of a famous movie star. She puts minimal content on the associated website – a two
paragraph plain text description of the actor’s movies. She conducts no commercial
activities from the website and makes no offer to sell the name.
Scenario 5. A young, little known junior senator from the midwest makes a
speech at the Democratic National Convention. It is a major hit with the people. The
next day the national newspapers are abuzz with speculation that the senator is going to
be the next major star of the Democratic Party and may even run for president in a
subsequent election. A domain name entrepreneur registers the senator’s name as a
domain name, thinking that it may be valuable one day.
It is difficult to apply existing domain name regulations to these scenarios. The
first hurdle in all five scenarios is that the complainant needs a trademark in his or her
personal name for the most affordable avenue of recourse - a UDRP arbitration.84 This
81

This hypothetical is based on: William J Clinton v Web of Deception, Claim Number:
FA0904001256123, National Arbitration Forum, full text available at
http://domains.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/1256123.htm , last viewed on August 10, 2009.
82
This hypothetical is based on: Anna Nicole Smith v DNS Research Inc, Claim No.
FA0312000220007, National Arbitration Forum, Feb 21, 2004 (available at:
http://www.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/220007.htm) (involving annanicolesmith.com domain name).
83
This hypothetical is based on: Tom Cruise v Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case No D2006-0560, 5
July, 2006 (available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2006/d2006-0560.html)
(involving tomcruise.com domain name).
84
UDRP, para 4(a)(i).
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may be difficult to establish even in the case of famous names.85 With respect to Scenario
5, for example, an unknown politician would not likely be successful. However, an
unknown politician who later became famous and used his name in commerce – for
example, by selling campaign merchandise relating to his name – might later succeed in a
UDRP arbitration. In this scenario, he would need to establish that the registrant was
using the name in bad faith and not for any legitimate purpose.86 An attempt to sell the
name for a profit in the course of a subsequent presidential election may satisfy this
requirement.
This seems theoretically unsatisfying. There is no clear principle to guide
registrants on what conduct is legitimate here. The reliance on the trademark policy
rationale underlying the UDRP creates significant uncertainty in relation to its application
to personal name disputes. Unjust enrichment theory, on the other hand, might support
rules to ensure return of a domain name to a rightful owner – or at least cancellation of
the registration - in cases where a registrant had taken unfair commercial advantage of the
name. This approach would not interfere with free speech as it would be based on unjust
commercial enrichments – not on use of another’s name for expressive purposes.
Applying an unjust enrichment approach to Scenario 1 in Table 2, for example,
we might find that a registrant who has used a politician’s name for purely expressive and
non-commercial purposes should not be subject to a transfer or cancellation order. While
at least one UDRP decision supports this result, the underlying theoretical rationale for
the decision is trademark policy. In other words, applying the UDRP as written, an
arbitrator found that, although former President William J Clinton did have a trademark
in his personal name, the registrant was not acting in bad faith in registering the name for
an expressive purpose.87 It would make more sense as a matter of theory and practice for
such disputes to be decided not on the grounds of trademark policy, but on the grounds of
unjust enrichment. An unjust enrichment rationale would support the development of
new regulations that do not require individuals to rely on trademarks in their personal
names in order to seek relief.
The ACPA personal name action provides an example of a regulation that
arguably evidences an unjust enrichment rationale, even though it is incorporated into
85

Bruce Springsteen v Jeff Burgar and Bruce Springsteen Club, WIPO Case No. D2000-1532, Jan.
25, 2001, ¶6 (available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1532.html) (“It
appears to be an established principle from cases such as Jeanette Winterson, Julia Roberts, and Sade that
in the case of very well known celebrities, their names can acquire a distinctive secondary meaning giving
rise to rights equating to unregistered trade marks, notwithstanding the non-registerability of the name
itself. It should be noted that no evidence has been given of the name "Bruce Springsteen" having acquired
a secondary meaning; in other words a recognition that the name should be associated with activities
beyond the primary activities of Mr. Springsteen as a composer, performer and recorder of popular music.
In the view of this Panel, it is by no means clear from the UDRP that it was intended to protect proper
names of this nature. As it is possible to decide the case on other grounds, however, the Panel will proceed
on the assumption that the name Bruce Springsteen is protected under the policy; it then follows that the
domain name at issue is identical to that name.”)
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UDRP, paras 4(b) and (c).
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Forum, full text available at http://domains.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/1256123.htm , last viewed on
August 10, 2009.
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trademark legislation.88 The provision does not require a complainant to establish a
trademark in her name in order to bring an action against a cybersquatter. The provision
is limited in operation in that the cybersquatter must have a clear sale motive. Thus, the
operation of a clickfarm under another person’s name will not run afoul of its terms. This
provision would thus be irrelevant to Scenario 3 in Table 2 for example. This scenario
involves an unauthorized fan website including a commercial clickfarm. However, the
provision would likely apply to Scenario 2. This scenario is more of a straightforward
cybersquatting case.
These results on personal name disputes are unsatisfying and piecemeal. Some
commercial activities are proscribed by legislation while others are not. The sui generis
ACPA provision is also limited because it is stand-alone legislation in the United States
with no analogs in other jurisdictions. Unless a complainant can establish a nexus with
the United States, and can assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the provision will
be useless. In any event, the costs of litigation may be prohibitive for many personal
name complainants.
The use of an unjust enrichment rationale to support the development of more
accessible personal domain name regulations may be useful for future practice in the
domain space. This approach would support the drafting of simple dispute resolution
procedures like the UDRP, but more broadly based on preventing unjust commercial
profits relating to the use of another person’s name in the domain space.89 A
restitutionary approach still leaves ample room to protect purely expressive uses of
personal names. In other words, the conduct of the registrants in Scenarios 1 and 4 in
Table 2 would likely be protected as they relate predominantly to speech and do not
implicate commerce. Scenario 3 is more problematic – the unauthorized fan website that
contains a clickfarm – because it combines commercial profits with expression.
Nevertheless, a restitutionary policy rationale for regulation would assist in developing
the appropriate contours for dealing with these kinds of situations in practice.
2. Culturally and Geographically Significant Words and Phrases
The regulatory matrix is more complex in the area of culturally and
geographically significant words and phrases such as ubuntu, ularu, and amazon. These
kinds of words only attain trademark status if they have sufficient secondary meaning in
association with the offering of goods or services.90 It is important for these terms to be
available for legitimate expressive uses in the domain space.91 For example, traders from
a particular region will often want to use a geographic term to indicate the geographical
source of the goods, as opposed to the manufacturing source.92 Any regulation that
88

15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A).
See, for example, Lipton, Celebrity in Cyberspace, supra note ___, at 1512-1526 (crafting a new
personal domain name dispute resolution policy along similar lines).
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LINDSAY, supra note ___, at 225.
91
id, at 225-226.
92
id, at 225 (“The inclusion of a geographical term in a registered trade mark always gives rise to
particular difficulties. The difficulties arise because, although it may be desirable to use a geographical
term to indicate the source of goods or services, registration would prevent the legitimate use of the
geographical term in a descriptive sense by other traders.”)
89

19

Domain Name Theory
inhibits the use of a geographical or cultural term in the domain space must take into
account the delicate balance of uses to which such a term may be put in practice. The
lack of a principled theoretical basis for domain name regulation has hindered the
development of effective regulations in the context of cultural and geographic
indicators.93 Consider the hypothetical scenarios in Table 3.
Table 3: Hypothetical Scenarios Involving Cultural and Geographic Indicators in
the Domain Space

Scenario 1. A popular online bookstore registers a domain name that corresponds
with the name of a famous landmark. A group of manufacturers located near the
landmark that uses its name in marketing their products and services wish to use the
name in the domain space.94
Scenario 2. The official tourist bureau for a popular skiing region utilizes the
name of the region in its domain name. A trademark holder with registered trademark
interests in the relevant term seeks transfer of the domain name.95
Scenario 3. A domain name speculator registers a group of domain names
corresponding with well-known geographical terms in the hopes of making money from
clickfarms on associated websites. Her aim is to target Internet users who might be
seeking information about the geographic locations. The click-through advertisements
are not specifically associated with any of the geographic locations.
Scenario 4. The President of the United States happens to have a last name that
corresponds with the name of a city in Japan. The “.com” domain name relating to the
name is registered to the city offices for the Japanese city. The President wants to use the
name for his new online open government initiative.

As was the case with the personal name scenarios in Table 2, the available
domain name regulations focus on trademark policy. A complainant who cannot
establish a trademark in a geographic or cultural term will have little meaningful recourse
against a registrant. In some cases, the registrant itself may hold a valid trademark in the
name – such as the amazon.com domain name in Scenario 1 in Table 3. Thus, the
regulations would protect that registrant against challenges from those with other
interests in the domain name.96 It is an open question whether this is an appropriate result
93

id, at 224-225 (noting that the World Intellectual Property Organization has, to date, declined to
develop specific protections for geographical terms because of the lack of clear international principles on
which such protections might be based).
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id, at 229 (describing the example of the amazon.com trademark).
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Case No D2000-0617 (17 August, 2000).
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For a more detailed discussion of the issue of multiple competing interests in a domain name, see
discussion in Jacqueline Lipton, A Winning Solution for YouTube and Utube? Corresponding Trademarks
and Domain Name Sharing, 21 HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 509 (2008) [hereinafter,
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as a matter of policy. In other words, the regulatory approach has been taken by default
that trademark rights take precedence over other legitimate interests.97 Questions relating
to the balance of competing legitimate interests in the domain space are beyond the scope
of this discussion, although the author has addressed them elsewhere.98 The focus of this
article is on creating a more coherent theoretical framework to regulate unfair or unjust
conduct in the domain space.
Existing regulations generally protect purely expressive uses of a domain name as
legitimate uses, even against trademark holders. Thus, the trademark holder in Scenario
2 will likely be out of luck provided that the tourist bureau is using the name for
expressive, rather than commercial, purposes.99 The lines between expressive and
commercial uses may become blurred if the registrant has a dual purpose in registering
the name. Not all commercial purposes are in bad faith, although courts and arbitrators
may be more protective of purely expressive uses than of other uses. While a number of
adjudicators have been sympathetic to those with expressive purposes, it is worth
pointing out that free speech is not expressly identified as a legitimate use in either the
ACPA or the UDRP.100 It is not impossible that a registrant whose primary motivation is
expressive could be found to be acting in bad faith.
Scenarios 3 and 4 in Table 3 raise complex issues that are not particularly well
dealt with under current regulations. While some of the domain names in Scenario 3 may
correspond with trademarks, they are also general terms that might attract Internet users
to the registrant’s clickfarm irrespective of any association with a particular mark. While
it is possible that the registrant had a sale motive in the back of her mind when she
registered the names, it is not clear that her actions are in bad faith in the traditional
cybersquatting sense. The registration of multiple domain names corresponding with
other people’s trademarks is an express bad faith factor under both the ACPA and the
UDRP.101 However, the registration of domain names corresponding with cultural and
geographic terms that may correspond in some cases with trademarks is not the same as
the intentional registration of trademarks in the domain space. The motivations for the
conduct are different. Unlike traditional cybersquatting, the former scenario relies on
happenstance. If it happens that a domain name relates to someone’s trademark, the
registrant might serendipitously profit from clickfarm custom by Internet users seeking
the trademark holder’s official website.
The trademark-focused provisions of the UDRP and other domain name
regulations are confusing in application in situations like Scenario 3. As the policy
97
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underpinnings for the regulations lie in trademark protection, there is no guidance to
arbitrators and judges as to the correct approach to disputes involving these kinds of
names. Presumably, in many situations like Scenario 3, arbitrators and judges will find
the registrant’s use of relevant terms to be legitimate. If there was no motive to profit
from someone else’s trademark, the application of rules based largely on trademark
policy are not very helpful. This is evidenced in Row 3 of Table 1, supra, suggesting that
most uses of cultural and geographic words that are not trademarked are legitimate.
Current trademark-focused policy has nothing to say about whether this is in fact
the right result in the domain space as a matter of more general theory. It is not clear
whether we need specific regulations to protect cultural and geographic indicators that are
not trademarked. If so, such regulations might usefully be based on unjust enrichment.
Irrespective of trademark interests, it may be worthwhile to develop rules that prevent,
say, clickfarmers from making commercial profits that capitalize on words and phrases
that have particular significance to one or more cultural groups, even if that significance
is not manifested in a trademark or other property right. In some cases, the words and
phrases may have a proprietary connection with a particular cultural group, but more
likely than not, an unjust enrichment rationale will be the best fit. Under this rationale, it
would be possible to develop rules based on the notion that a registrant should not be
unjustly enriched at the expense of a group of people with a legitimate interest in a
particular word or phrase.
Scenario 4 in Table 3 is another problematic situation. It does not involve any
trademarks at all, unless the Japanese city officials have trademarked the city’s name or
the President has established sufficient secondary meaning in his name to support a
trademark.102 In the absence of trademark rights, current regulations give little guidance
as to who has a better right to the domain name. It is an open question whether any set of
rules should be developed for rare scenarios like this. It may be preferable to deal with
them on a case by case basis. In any event, the adoption of a theoretical basis for domain
name regulation based on unjust enrichment may be helpful in delineating the kinds of
conduct that should not be regulated at all. A regulatory approach premised on unjust
enrichment at the expense of another would militate against regulating situations like
Scenario 4 in Table 3. The adoption of a clear theoretical basis for domain name
regulation that is broader than mere trademark policy may better delineate which
situations require regulation and which simply involve a balance of competing legitimate
interests in the domain space. Scenario 4 is likely an example of the latter.
102

High-level politicians have had some success in establishing trademarks in their personal names:
William J Clinton v Web of Deception, Claim Number: FA0904001256123, National Arbitration Forum,
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3. Generic Terms
Generic terms raise another set of regulatory and policy issues to those discussed
above. Generic terms are broader than other classes of words and phrases in the domain
space. They include words like love, joy, business, and hope, not to mention sex, the
subject of one of the most intriguing domain name battles fought outside the bounds of
trademark law.103 More recently, P2P.com has been the subject of controversy in the
domain space.104 Generic terms are generally neither trademarked nor trademarkable,
subject to some relatively rare exceptions.105 Nevertheless, they are often valuable cyberrealty. A survey of the top twenty-five reported domain name sales at the end of 2007
illustrates that generic terms generally raised the largest sales revenues of any domain
names.106 “Porn.com” raised almost ten million dollars, while “business.com” and
“diamond.com” tied at seven and a half million apiece.107 Even names like “fish.com”
raised just over a million dollars, while “if.com” and “rock.com” tied at a million.108
Again, current trademark-focused rules are a poor fit for conflicts that arise in
relation to generic domain names. A registrant of multiple generic terms in the domain
space may have a variety of commercial and expressive motives, none of which likely
have anything to do with interfering with a trademark holder’s rights. There is a healthy
and active market in generic domain names that has developed outside the realm of
existing trademark-focused regulations.109 This raises a number of issues for regulators,
including the foundational question as to whether there is ever a valid theoretical
justification for regulating generic domain names. The answer to this question depends
on how much of a free market approach one is prepared to take with respect to the
domain space.
To the extent that regulations have been found wanting in the context of generic
terms, the underlying theoretical quandary has related to the categorization of generic
names as intangible property. In other words a property rights rationale for domain name
regulation potentially comes into play here. For example, the “sex.com” domain name
was the subject of a conversion action under Californian tort law.110 This dispute arose in
circumstances where the name was, in effect, converted for the purposes of the
103
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Californian statute by a fraudulent request to the registering authority to transfer the name
to a party who had no legal entitlement to the name. A similar situation arose more
recently in the case of the “P2P.com” domain name. Registrants of generic names that
are “stolen” in this way have very little guidance as to their rights. The regulatory
impulse to date has been to gravitate towards property theory and explain the conflict in
terms of the misappropriation of another’s property.
However, as noted in Part II.B, property analogies can be problematic in the
domain space because they never apply perfectly to the virtual world. The attraction of
the property theory is that it fits the way people routinely think about domain names.
Markets for trading in domain names have developed over the years, and people treat the
domain names as proprietary assets.111 Despite the market approach, the judicial verdict
has been less clear. While some judges have accepted domain names as intangible
property, others have not.112 This might be a good time in the development of domain
name jurisprudence to make a clear decision one way or the other. In other words,
regulators could make a policy decision to accept domain names as a form of property,
and thus accept a property rights rationale for their regulation. This would include
allowing more ready access to trespass and conversion actions in cases involving generic
domain names. Alternatively, regulators could make the opposite decision and deny
domain names proprietary status. Any subsequent regulations might then have to be
based on an unjust enrichment rationale.
This article suggests that the property model may be preferable for several
reasons. It best accords with the way market participants relate to domain names. Even
though a domain name is a form of contractual license from a registering authority to a
registrant,113 it results in a valuable asset that is freely traded on the open market, and that
is occasionally stolen by a bad faith actor. Even though a transfer of a domain name is, in
reality, a de-registration to the original registrant and re-registration to the new registrant,
it is now treated routinely as a seamless transfer as if the name was being handed directly
from the original registrant to the new registrant. Further, the acceptance of a property
rights rationale for regulating generic domain names could take advantage of existing
property based laws such as theft and conversion and simply extend them judicially to
virtual property. An non-proprietary unjust enrichment rationale, on the other hand,
111
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would necessitate going back to the drawing board in terms of drafting appropriate
regulations.
4. Typosquatting
Typosquatting has been defined as: “taking advantage of common misspellings
made by Internet users who are looking for a particular site of a particular provider of
goods or services, in order to obtain some benefit therefrom.”114 This definition covers
typosquatting in relation to trademarks, but theoretically one could just as easily squat on
other words and phrases. One might register common misspellings of generic words,
personal names, and cultural or geographic indictors in the hope of attracting Internet
custom. For example, a domain name speculator who could not afford to bargain for
“porn.com”115 might just as easily register “pron.com” in the hope of attracting
customers.116 Such conduct is unlikely to amount to bad faith or to be regulated in any
way under existing domain name rules because it does not implicate any trademark
interests. The most common forms of typosquatting involve trademarks and, to some
extent, personal names.117
Typosquatting that involves misspelling of a trademark is currently regulated by
the ACPA and the UDRP. Each of these rules covers situations where the domain name
is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark.118 However, where a domain name
corresponds with a person’s name, the complainant will be out of luck unless she can
establish a trademark in her name. The sui generis prohibitions on personal name
cybersquatting in the Lanham act do not cover registrations of domain names that are
confusingly similar to a person’s name.119 They only cover registration of the person’s
actual name in the domain space. Misspellings of generic, cultural, and geographic terms
that do not correspond with trademarks do not currently raise the specter of regulation.
There is perhaps no reason why they should, but again it is a question that has not
received any meaningful regulatory attention.
Typosquatting, particularly with respect to trademarks and some personal names,
should be an easy issue in the regulatory context. The fact that someone has gone to the
trouble of registering a deliberate misspelling of someone else’s mark or name suggests a
bad faith motive in and of itself. It may therefore raise an initial presumption of bad faith
commercial conduct that should be regulated as a matter of policy. The question then
arises as to the basis on which such conduct should be regulated as a policy matter.
Typosquatting, at least as it relates to trademarks, can be, and currently is, regulated
under the trademark policy rationale.
Under this approach, commercially profitable uses of a misspelling of another’s
mark in the domain space attract sanctions, while purely expressive uses do not. We
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might therefore expect the regulation of typosquatting on trademarks to mirror the
regulation of “sucks”-type domain names relating to trademarks. While speech should be
protected, unfair commercial advantage-taking should not. A brief look back at Table 1
suggests that there are potentially some differences in the application of current
regulations to typosquatting as compared with “sucks”-type domain names. It appears
that typosquatting more readily attracts sanctions than the registration of “sucks”-type
domain names. This is unsurprising given that the deliberate misspelling of a mark is
more likely to be undertaken for a commercial purpose than the registration of a “sucks”type domain name. The latter tend more often to be used for commentary and criticism
while the former tend to be used more for unfair commercial advantage.
Over time, savvy domain name speculators have come to use “sucks”-type
domains for commercial purposes, hiding behind the pejorative term to clothe their
conduct in the guise of speech. As observed by David Lindsay, the use of “sucks”-type
domain names in this way has come to be termed “sham speech”.120 While still amenable
to regulation under a trademark policy rationale, arbitrators and judges approaching sham
speech websites must be careful to apply the trademark-protecting laws as robustly as
they would in the case of typosquatting.
This discussion has not yet touched on typosquatting on personal names. Many
personal names are commercially valuable in spite of the potential lack of trademark
protection. This is one reason why Congress adopted specific anti-cybersquatting rules
relating to personal names.121 In the case of typosquatting on a non-trademarked personal
name, a trademark policy rationale cannot be the basis for regulation. Presumably, a
property rights rationale is likewise not a particularly good fit in the absence of clearly
accepted property rights in personal names.122 So again, the only viable theoretical
justification here would be unjust enrichment. Drawing on unjust enrichment theory, one
could develop accessible rules for individuals aggrieved by typosquatting on their names
in the domain space for unfair commercial profit motives. This would be similar to the
approach that could be taken to better streamline regulations relating to the use of
personal names in the domain space more generally.123

IV. THE ROLE OF THE REGISTRY
One piece of the puzzle missing from the preceding discussion relates to the role
of domain name registries. A significant advantage of creating a clearer theoretical basis
for domain name regulation would, in fact, be increased clarity as to the role and
potential liability of domain name registries in domain name disputes. Existing law and
policy has been unclear about the extent to which a domain name registry should ever be
120
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liable for bad faith conduct by domain name registrants. There are arguments both for
and against the imposition of such liability. In early trademark-focused cases, registries
were routinely added as litigants in trademark infringement and dilution actions.124 This
was an obvious strategy for plaintiffs. The registry was often much easier to locate than
the registrant. The registry may also be less impecunious than the registrant. The
registry also maintained the necessary contact information about the registrant.
Moreover, in early domain name cases, the registry was typically Network Solutions
situated in Reston, Virginia.125 This made the assertion of jurisdiction under the Lanham
Act an easy matter for potential plaintiffs.
The registry was obviously complicit in the registration in that it had taken the
registrant’s money and handed out a domain name that corresponded with the plaintiff’s
mark. Thus, it was fairly easy to argue at least contributory trademark infringement or
dilution. Because Network Solutions was not particularly well financed and was simply
implementing what was initially thought to be a purely technical process, its officers were
not trained to detect and prevent trademark infringement.126 It was possible to argue that
once a registry had knowledge – in the form of a complaint by a trademark holder – that a
domain name registration potentially infringed the mark, it should take action to cancel
the registration.127 While this view has some merit, it potentially puts the registry in the
role of having to adjudicate between two competing claims if the registrant itself has
asserted a legitimate interest in the domain name. Again, most domain name registries
are ill-equipped to determine the appropriate outcome of disputes involving competing
claims in a domain name.
Other Internet intermediaries have faced analogous situations. Many Internet
service providers have been asked to remove material contributed by their users on the
basis that it infringes a copyright,128 infringes a trademark,129 or is defamatory.130
Internet intermediaries are often not in a position to ascertain the validity of these claims
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against, say, a fair use defense asserted by an alleged copyright infringer.131 Ultimately,
Congress has legislated in some of these areas in an attempt to clarify the responsibility
of the intermediaries. Thus, § 230 of the Communications Decency Act provides a safe
harbor for Internet intermediaries for liability for the speech of others.132 This applies
significantly in the defamation context to prevent a chilling affect on Internet speech that
might result if the gateway services enabling online speech faced legal liability for the
speech of others.133 In the copyright context, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act also
provides a safe harbor from copyright infringement for Internet service providers that
have acted expeditiously in removing infringing material on receipt of a notice by the
copyright holder.134
The role of domain name registrars in terms of their liability for the conduct of
their users has been variously dealt with in the context of domain name regulation. Much
of the rule-making here is contractual. Since being joined as defendants in early
trademark cases, domain name registries quickly inserted into their registration policies
clauses that disclaimed liability for trademark infringement. These clauses squarely
placed the onus on registrants to ensure that they were not infringing other people’s
trademark rights or other legal interests.135 The UDRP is a significant part of this
contractual approach. It contractually binds registrants to submit to mandatory
arbitrations if a trademark owner complains about the registration of the registrant’s
domain name.136 Under the UDRP, the registry represents that it will abide by decisions
of arbitrators and domestic courts on matters relating to rights in domain names.137 These
contractual measures take much of the early pressure off domain name registries by
making it clear that they do not – and cannot be expected to – take initial responsibility
for bad faith registrations in breach of trademark policy. However, they do not go much
beyond trademark policy.
While UDRP arbitrators may squeeze disputes involving domain names of
unclear trademark status within their jurisdiction, the expressed justification must always
be finding a trademark interest in a word or phrase in the domain space. In other words, a
UDRP arbitrator, seeking to be sympathetic to the holder of an interest in a personal
name or geographic term, might order the transfer a domain name corresponding to such
a term to the complainant. However, in these cases the arbitrator must find a trademark
131
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right in that name or term on which to base the transfer order. There is simply no action
available under the UDRP without a trademark.138
This fact may have caused some arbitrators to readily accept trademarks in words
that have not unequivocally achieved this status.139 The fact that the UDRP is the most
accessible avenue of recourse for domain name complainants might motivate some
arbitrators too readily to find trademarks in personal names, and cultural and geographic
indicators. This in itself may be a sufficient argument for identifying and developing
theoretical justifications for domain name regulation outside of trademark policy.
At this point in time, the adoption of regulations that are accessible to disputants,
but that encompass broader policy aims, such as the prevention of unjust enrichment
more generally, may be a useful development that will lead to more coherent regulations
in the future. Such an approach may be instructive not only for domain name disputes
per se, but also for disputes involving Internet search engines more generally. Also, the
forthcoming extension of the domain space to incorporate new gTLDs would benefit
from a clearer understanding of the kinds of policies that should be reflected in the
resolution of disputes involving domain names.140
The adoption of a broader and more coherent theoretical framework for domain
name disputes would bring with it a need to clarify the extent to which domain name
registries might be held liable for infringements of protected interests in domain names.
In the trademark policy arena, a decision has already been made that registries are not
generally required to take initial responsibility for the registration of trademarked terms,
but are required to abide by remedies granted by arbitrators and courts.141 As a costbenefits exercise, this makes sense, particularly given the easily accessible mechanism
now available for trademark holders to protect their interests under the UDRP.
The question remains as to whether there are other areas of domain name policy
that may require a different balance of interests in terms of the potential liability of
registrars for conduct of registrants. The obvious example is the relatively rare situation
involving conversion or theft of domain names, secured by a wrongdoer fraudulently
approaching a registrar for transfer of a name originally registered to someone else.
These situations raise a different cost-benefits analysis to the trademark policy issues
addressed by the UDRP. In the case of fraudulent conversions of domain names
involving generic terms the domain name registry is implicated in a different way to the
way in which it is typically involved in a trademark-focused dispute. In the latter
situation, the registry is simply performing its typical functions of processing often large
138
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volumes of applications for currently unregistered domain names. In contrast, the former
situation involves a request to transfer a domain name from an existing registrant into the
hands of a new registrant. In these cases, it is reasonable to expect the registry to be at
least a little bit vigilant to ensure that the original registrant has indeed acquiesced to the
transfer. In the case of any doubt, it is not difficult for the registrant to send an email to
the original registrant to verify the transfer.
The Ninth Circuit court took this view in the “sex.com” case. Holding Network
Solutions – the registry – liable for conversion under the Californian statute, the court
noted that Network Solutions had made no effort to contact the original registrant of the
domain name before giving the name away on the basis of a facially suspect letter from a
third party who had subsequently left the jurisdiction.142 While accepting that the third
party (Cohen) was the guilty party in the case, the court felt that there was nothing
inappropriate about holding Network Solutions responsible for giving away the domain
name when it could have taken simple precautions to ensure that the transfer request was
not fraudulent.143 With respect to the argument accepted in the District Court about the
policy problems inherent in imposing liability on domain name registries, the Ninth
Circuit noted:
“The district court was worried that “the threat of litigation threatens
to stifle the registration system by requiring further regulations by
[Network Solutions] and potential increases in fees.” …. Given that
Network Solutions’s “regulations” evidently allowed it to hand over a
registrant’s domain name on the basis of a facially suspect letter
without even contacting him, “further regulations” don’t seem like
such a bad idea. And the prospect of higher fees presents no issue here
that it doesn’t in any other context. A bank could lower ATM fees if it
didn’t have to pay security guards, but we doubt that most depositors
would think that was a good idea.”144
In fraudulent transfer situations there is a good argument for imposing liability on
a domain name registry if the registry has not taken inexpensive and simple precautions
to ensure the validity of a transfer request. The question remains as to what is the
appropriate policy justification for the imposition of such liability. While the Ninth
Circuit was prepared to rely on the property rights rationale underpinning the Californian
conversion statute,145 its holding is specific to its interpretation of that statute. A more
widely accepted property rights rationale for these kinds of cases might lead to judicial
interpretations of existing legislation in other states that would more readily accept
property rights in generic domain names in support of these kinds of holdings. At the
present time, a property rights approach to domain name disputes is not generally
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accepted and some situations involving alleged conversion of others’ generic domain
names have proved difficult to resolve as a matter of law.146
Alternatively, an unjust enrichment rationale would be a theoretical possibility for
remedying fraudulent transfer situations. Where a fraudulent transferee is unjustly
enriched at the expense of the original registrant, the domain name registry might be held
liable for facilitating the unjust enrichment. Unlike the property rights approach, the
unjust enrichment rationale probably calls for new regulations that are less focused on
property than current conversion laws, and that more squarely deal with unjust
enrichments outside of property rights. It may ultimately be possible to develop a new
kind of UDRP that is more squarely based on the unjust enrichment concept and is not
limited to trademark policy. This would effectively allow a cost-effective and accessible
avenue of recourse for complainants and might also side-step the question of registry
liability, because registries would presumably continue to be bound by private arbitral
decisions involving domain names. Perhaps the system could work towards a general
unjust enrichment model to capture unjust commercial conduct in the domain space
involving any kind of word or phrase. In the meantime, registrants faced with fraudulent
transfer situations may have to rely on a property rights rationale and pursue actions
under existing theft and conversion laws.

V. CONCLUSIONS
The domain name system currently suffers from a lack of cohesive and coherent
underlying theory. This is partly the result of a lack of focus on domain name issues
outside trademark-oriented disputes. Importantly, there is no single entity that has global
constitutional competence to create an overarching policy for domain name regulation.
Nevertheless, the gaps and inconsistencies in current regulations are causing problems of
application in practice. The domain name system requires the identification of an
underlying theoretical framework that would support more workable and coherent
regulations. In particular, trademark policy – although useful to counteract traditional
cybersquatting – has significant limitations when applied to more general practices in
global domain name markets.
An examination of existing domain name regulations, coupled with approaches by
courts and arbitrators in applying them to novel situations, suggests the development of
an underlying model that might draw from three distinct theoretical bases: trademark
policy, restitution, and property theory. Developing a framework that draws on the
synergies between these three areas theoretical bases would more effectively facilitate
future developments in domain name regulation and practice that better address the needs
of modern domain name markets.
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Clearly, this article is a preliminary foray into largely unexplored territory. As
such, it is somewhat tentative and general in its conclusions. Importantly, as
acknowledged above,147 there are three pressing, and often overlapping, challenges facing
today’s domain name regulation system, and this article focuses predominantly on only
one of them. The challenges are to: (a) develop an appropriate theoretical framework for
future regulation; (b) identify an entity, or set of entities, with sufficient constitutional
competence to implement regulations based on that framework; and, (c) ensure that any
regulations can be meaningfully enforced by private individuals or other institutions with
sufficient standing or power to enforce them. These are all significant challenges that
have so far received little attention in existing scholarship. Hopefully, this article will
serve as a useful starting point for debates that cover all of these aspects of domain name
governance, as well as the interplay between them.
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See discussion in Part III.A, supra.
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